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Melvyn R. Durchslag† 
As my mentor, Edward A. (“Ted”) Mearns taught me how to 
teach constitutional law. (For those of you who are my former 
students, you can blame Ted, not me.) Actually, I overstate it. He 
didn’t teach me how to master the art of classroom antics; I could not 
come close to imitating him in that regard. Nor did he teach me how 
to do the Socratic method. That was all my doing, or undoing, as the 
case may be. No, he taught me far more important things. 
Ted taught me how to read a constitutional case. You would 
expect I learned that skill in law school, but I didn’t, not really. But 
if not in school, I thought I certainly learned this skill over my several 
years of researching and litigating constitutional cases as a practicing 
lawyer. But I didn’t, at least not the way Ted read constitutional law 
cases. First, and maybe most importantly, Ted taught me how and 
why everything in constitutional law is interconnected, something you 
never appreciate as a student, a practitioner, or a litigator. As he used 
to say, you push the balloon in one spot and a bump appears in 
another place altogether. Students rarely appreciate this. And 
litigators generally don’t care because their only goal is winning the 
case at hand. 
Ted also taught me how to look for the nuances, the linguistic 
expressions of the Justices, their phraseology, and the structure of 
their opinions. These help reveal what was really going on in the case. 
Because for Ted, constitutional law was not an abstraction. It was not 
simply, or even primarily, an exploration and study of ideas and often 
conflicting ideologies. It was about people who cared deeply and 
passionately about an outcome that impacted someone’s life in a 
profound way. After all, William Marbury couldn’t have cared less 
whether it was “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to [s]ay what the law is.”1 Marbury was an angry and 
disappointed man, and it was that anger and disappointment which 
led to the case that to this day defines the judicial role in our 
constitutional scheme. Ted brought that home to me. 
In addition, Ted taught me the importance of concurring and 
dissenting opinions, not for the voyeuristic reasons we all seem 
fascinated by, but because concurring opinions are often the road map 
to the next case the Court will hear. And dissenting opinions often 
become the majority’s view, as Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and, more 
recently (and to my mind, unfortunately), Thomas can so well attest. 
It may take decades or only a few years before that occurs, but one 
who teaches constitutional law must be able to convey not only a 
sense of our constitutional history but of its future direction as well. 
 
† Professor of Law Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University.  
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
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As both a constitutional historian and a constitutional prognosticator, 
Ted was not only good; he was profound. 
But more than anything else Ted taught me how to “do” 
constitutional law. What that means precisely, I’m not sure. Maybe 
Justice Stewart best described it with his oft quoted quip in Jacobellis 
v. Ohio.2 But whatever it means, Ted “did” constitutional law. He 
lived and breathed the subject. His analogous world was that of 
constitutional law. It was part and parcel of the way he thought, not 
only about law but about life as well. To him, constitutional law was 
an extension of his devout Catholic faith. To Ted, constitutional law 
was law’s moral compass. It guided and ordered civil society and set 
the goals and aspirations of human interaction. 
Moreover the ambiguity of constitutional law, its famous or 
infamous incoherence, and its seeming political dimensions never 
seemed to trouble him much. He told me a story when I first started 
teaching constitutional law, a story I have carried with me ever since. 
It is about an astronomer’s conference, kind of like the Association of 
American Law Schools’ annual meeting of pontificators. There was, as 
there always is, a main speaker who was at the podium expounding 
on some new and unique—and somewhat off the wall—astrophysical 
explanation of the origin of the universe. In the audience, one 
astronomer turned to his neighbor and said, “Here goes old Fred 
again. Don’t pay any attention to him. I was in graduate school with 
Fred, and all he did was sit on the quad lawn at night looking up at 
the stars, probably smoking a bit of the wacky weed, writing love 
poems to his girlfriend du jour. He was a flake then, and it appears he 
hasn’t progressed much since those days.”  
The punch line of Ted’s story is that Fred may or may not be the 
world’s greatest flake. In the final analysis, however, Fred’s theory of 
the origin of the universe is either right or it is wrong, and whether 
Fred is a flake or not has nothing to do with that essential 
proposition. It is the job of the constitutional scholar, Ted said, to 
seek, for example, whether Justice Scalia or Justice Souter has the 
better constitutional argument. And in doing so, she must ignore the 
fact that one Justice’s general view of our constitutional order is more 
“conservative” or more “liberal” than another’s. Moreover, the truth 
doesn’t lie in whether the scholar aligns herself more closely with one 
Justice’s judicial or political philosophy than another’s. The answer 
must lie in some objective analysis that transcends any particular 
political or judicial philosophy. Like Fred’s goofy theory of the origin 
 
2. 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The exact wording of the 
famous, or infamous as the case may be, quote is: “I shall not today 
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description [i.e., obscenity]; and 
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it 
when I see it . . . .” Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
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of the universe, whatever his political philosophy, Justice Scalia is 
either more correct or less correct than the Justices with whom he 
disagrees.  
I concede that this sounds more than just a bit quaint in today’s 
world, even in today’s world of scholarship. But when you think 
about it, to view constitutional law, or law in any of its dimensions, 
in any other way can only render one hopeless to do anything but be 
a constant critic. One can never become an agent of change through 
rational dialogue without the ability to pick apart a legal argument or 
conclusion on its own terms without reference to the individual 
making the argument or propounding the theory. To do that is hard 
work, far harder than expounding a political or constitutional 
philosophy and finding some Supreme Court language to support your 
view. Ted was willing to do that hard work; it was part, indeed the 
essence, of his makeup. That, in large part, made Ted a star—in the 
classrooms of Virginia, Northwestern, and Case Western Reserve; as 
captain of the cross country team at Yale University; and more 
generally in life itself. 
Most of my remarks have chronicled my memories of Ted in our 
professional interactions. But I don’t want to leave anyone with the 
impression that Ted was all work or that Ted’s only importance in 
my life was as a mentor who shaped my professional development. He 
certainly was that, but above all he was my friend. And friendship, 
and what friendship means, is extraordinarily difficult to put into 
words. So I will just say that I treasured being with him, and I am 
thankful that Bob Lawry and I were able to dine with him on several 
occasions in his final days. I don’t know what he knew about his 
prognosis, but he never let on that he either knew or was overly 
concerned. “Oh the doctors are going to try this or that and 
everything is going to be fine,” Ted would say. He was always upbeat 
and on the road to recovery.  
But maybe his most endearing and enduring quality was his 
selflessness. It was that which made Ted a true and valued friend and 
devoted husband. Indeed, Ted literally sacrificed everything, including 
his own health, to care for the love of his life, Pat, a truly remarkable 
woman in her own right. 
I personally don’t believe in an afterlife, either physical or 
spiritual. But maybe for the first time in my life, I hope, for Ted’s 
sake, that my belief or lack thereof is wrong. For if anyone deserves a 
special place in heaven, it is my friend and mentor, Ted Mearns.
 
